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JUDGE LEARNED HAND AND
THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
ROBERT S. LANCASTER*

Learned Hand stands among the great judges of the AngloAmerican legal tradition. He is pre-eminently the judge's judge. His
long judicial career, spanning one of the crucial periods in the development of American law, and his long service on the bench in a
circuit where crucial legal issues come into final focus and where a
major part of the commercial law of the nation is first enunciated and
explained, peculiarly fit him for the task of explaining the judge's
function in the American system of law and the court's role in our
jural order. His own legal experience, his non-official writings, brief
as they are, and his official opinions are the sources from which his
views as to the limits of judicial discretion may be determined.
Sir Frederic Pollock has said that "the duty of the courts is to keep
the rules of law in harmony with the enlightened, common sense of
the nation,"' for the accomplishment of which caution and valor are
both needed, caution in making advances which have not become
generally acceptable and valor in dispensing with technical difficulties
and in overriding what is merely a show of authority on the part of
current opinion. If this be the true measure of judicial activity, certainly Judge Learned Hand has filled nicely the judge's role. He has
achieved this happy balance between caution and valor which is at
once the hallmark and the insignium of merit of great judges.
Like Oliver Wendell Holmes, from whom he drew inspiration and
judicial comfort, Learned Hand is hard to classify. He belongs to no
school of jurisprudence; he is old-fashioned enough to believe in
legal principles and modern enough to recognize as a fact the creative
activity of the judiciary in moulding the law to fit new circumstances
and in shaping its growth in accordance with the drive and movement
of the times. Fortunately, he has expressed his views in his speeches
and non-legal writings; but, had he remained silent in these respects,
his more than two thousand opinions would have revealed his con* Professor of Political Science and Dean of Men, University of the South,
Sewanee, Tennessee; Exchange Professor of Comparative Government and
Political Theory, University of Baghdad, Iraq, 1955-56.
-- '
1. Pollock, Judicial Caution and Valor, 45 L.Q. REV. 293, 295 (1929).
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victions to the scholar persistent enough to explore the record of his
intellectual and judicial activity. It remains to determine their substance and scope and to measure his official practices and pronouncements as against his unofficial statements.
LEARNED HAND'S VIEws ON THE FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIARY 2

Judge Hand has stated his conception of the nature and limits of
the judicial function in a few articles contributed over the years to
legal periodicals, in his speeches, and in his opinions. In 1916 he contributed an article to the HarvardLaw Review entitled "The Speech of
Justice" in which he examined briefly the nature of the judge's work
and the proper scope of his creative activity. This article came at a
time when the courts were quite generally under the influence of
conservative opinion and were freezing the attempts of assemblies
of the people to cope with the new problems of an expanding industrial society. The dominant influences were then demanding that
judges should adopt a passive role, remain loyal to the law as it was
written and refrain from encouraging by judicial interpretation the
aspirations of the new class of industrial workers, who were striving
to improve their lot under "a system framed for the most part for the
protection of private property and for the prevention of thoroughgoing
social regulation." 3 These influences justified their position on the

ground that judicial loyalty to the existing law was the price of judicial
immunity from political pressure and of security of tenure. To encourage the judiciary to weave into the law by interpretation the
half-expressed yearnings of an unformulated and scarcely vocal public
opinion appeared to them subversive and monstrously wicked. Judge
Hand with his penetrating understanding appreciated both the strength
and the weakness of this position. He wrote:
2. For purposes of comparison see the following books and articles: CAHILL,
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION (1952); CARDOZA, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss
(1922); PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 150-75 (2d ed. 1951); REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE,
ITS A.IEcAN PROPHETS (1951); Carter, The Provinces of the Written and the

Unwritten Law, 24 Am. L. REv. 1 (1890); Clark, The Dilemma of American

Judges: Is too Great "Trust for Salvation" Placed in Them? 35 A.B.A.J. 8
(1949); Franki,
What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. Rnv. 645 (1932); Fuller,
Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946); Haines, General
Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences
in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 96 (1922); Hutcheson, The

Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); Llewellyn, How Appellate Courts Decide Cases, 16
PA. B.A.Q. 220 (1945); Pollock, A Plea for Historical Interpretation,39 L.Q.
REv. 163 (1923); Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 3 A.B.A.J. 55
(1917); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Huv.L. REv. 129 (1893); Radin, Early Statutory Interpretation, 38 ILL. L. REV. 16, 25 (1943); Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L.
REv. 863 (1930).
3. Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HAV. L. REV. 617 (1916), reprinted in
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This attitude is in part right and in part wrong. Much of the law is indeed
written in formal shape, the authoritative emanation of the state through
agencies to which the judge is confessedly inferior. Beyond the limits
of such ambiguity as the words may honestly carry the judge surely has
no duty but to understand, and to bring to his understanding good faith
and dutiful acquiescence. For the results he may not justly be held accountable; to hold him is to disregard the social will, which has imposed
upon him that very quiescence that prevents the effectuation of his
personal notions. There is a hierarchy of power in which the judge stands
low; he has no right to divinations of public opinion which run counter
to its last formal expression. Nevertheless, the judge has, by custom,
his own proper representative character as a complementary organ of
the social will, and in so far as conservative sentiment, in the excess
of caution that he shall be obedient, frustrates his free power by interpretation to manifest the half-framed purposes of his time, it misconceives the historical significance of his position and will in the end render
him incompetent to perform the very duties upon which it lays so
much emphasis. The profession of the law of which he is a part is charged
with the articulation and the final incidence of the successive efforts
toward justice; it must feel the circulation of the communal blood or
it will wither and drop off, a useless member.4

In this article Learned Hand argued for greater freedom for the
judiciary. While he admitted that the law "must be content to
lag behind the best inspiration of its time until it feels behind it
the weight of such general acceptance as will give sanction to its
pretensions to unquestioned dictation, ' 5 yet he expressed himself as
believing that courageous experimentation in times of great change
in the convictions of men was necessary to keep the law abreast of
the times and in tune with the deeper aspirations of the age. There
had been a time, he reasoned, when the legal profession could speak
with authority as representative of those interests and that class which
could obtain representation. Then justice could be uttered by judges
without misgivings, for they were spokesmen for a homogeneous
society. To Hand that day had long passed. The judge now, he felt,
must adapt himself to a changed society and act as mediator between
the forces clamoring for recognition and the old seeking to maintain
their ancient dominance:
As mediator it must grasp from within the meaning of each phase of
the social will; it must divine the form of what lies confused and unexpressed and must bring to light the substance of what is half surmised.
To adjust and to compromise, to balance and to value, one must first of all
learn to know not from the outside, but as the will knows.6
L. HAND, THE SPRrT oF LIBERTY 14 (Dilliard ed. 1952)
L. HAND).
4. L. HAND 14-15. (Emphasis added.)
5. L. HAND 15-16.
6. L. HAND 17.
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Throughout this article Judge Hand emphasized the creative role
of the profession at large and the bench in particular. He expressed
the view that like all public functionaries the bench must face up to
the responsibility of choosing and of choosing well. He felt that
"courage and insight alone can in the end win confidence and power." 7
Yet it can not be said ,that Learned Hand would have the judiciary in
the forefront of the battlers for change and reform. He recognized
early in his judicial career that judges are the guardians of a conservative social force and that their particular brand of courage must
be tempered with caution and strengthened by restraint in order to
preserve a continuity with the past.
In a tribute written for Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's eightyfifth birthday, Judge Hand further clarified his views in respect to
iudicial caution. He wrote:
Judges are usually taken from that part of the bar which has distinguished itself in the field of action. They are likely to be men of
strong will, set beliefs and conventional ideals. They are almost inevitably
drawn from the propertied class and share its assumptions. Perhaps on
the whole it is better so; law is the precipitate of a long past of active
controversy and can not be successfully administered by those to whom
equilibrium has no,'proper values of its own. Still, its virtues are also
its defects, for no formulas are final and the political results of a past
generation seldom measure very accurately the opposing forces of the next.
If we must not change too quickly, at least we must not refuse to change
at all.8
In this same tribute, a short but pithy piece of writing prepared for
publication in the New York World, Judge Hand revealed his sympathy
for the Holmesian view that any piece of legislation that can get itself enacted is apt to have behind it reasonable support and justification
and his own view that the surest way to protect the power and prestige
of the judiciary and to preserve the atmosphere of aloofness and
impersonality so vital to its prestige and power is to remove it from
the impact of heated and controversial public issues best settled by
the more definitely political organs of government. He reasoned that
'tin such matters the odium of disappointing large numbers of persons
mpist rest somewhere, and perhaps the most important question involved is at whose doors that odium shall lie." 9 He doubted that the
courts could bear it while keeping an official irresponsibility to public
opinion.
It is probable that the judicial caution, which is only one of the
elements in the remarkable blend produced by the Hand formula, may
be accounted for by taking into consideration his skepticism and his
pragmatism. Like Holmes, Judge Hand is no believer in absolutes.
7. L. HA=i 19.
8. L. HAND 24, reprinted from New York World, March 8, 1926.
9. L. HAND 28.
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Speaking on the subject, "Sources of Tolerance" before the University
of Pennsylvania Law School in 1930, Judge Hand said:
We shall not succeed by any attempt to put the old wine in new bottles;
liberty is an essence so volatile that it will escape any vial however corked.
It rests in the hearts of men, in the belief that knowledge is hard to get,
that man must break through again and again the thin crust on which
he walks, that the certainties of today may become the superstitions of
tomorrow; that we have no warrant of assurance save by everlasting
readiness to test and test again. William James was its great American
apostle in modem times; we shall do well to remember him.10
Again in 1932 in a speech before the twelfth annual dinner of the
Federal Bar Association Learned Hand voiced his distrust of eternal
verities:
Man may be a little lower than the angels, but he has not yet shaken off
the brute. His passions, his thinking, his body carry their origins with
them; and he fails if he vaingloriously denies them. His path is strewn
with carnage, the murderer lurks always not far beneath, to break out
from time to time, peace resolutions to the contrary notwithstanding. What
he has gained has been with immeasurable waste; what he shall gain will
be with immeasurably more. Trial and error is the confession, not indeed
of an impotent, but of a wayward creature, blundering about in worlds
not realized. But the Absolute is mute; no tables come from Sinai to
guide him; the brazen sky gives no answers to his prayers. He must
grope his way through the murk, as his remote forerunners groped, in
the dank, hot world in which they moved. Look where he will, there
are no immutable laws to which he can turn; no, not even that in
selfless abnegation he must give up what he craves, for life is selfassertion. Conflict is normal; we reach accommodations as wisdom must
teach us that it does not pay to fight. And wisdom may; for wisdom
comes as false assurance goes-false assurance, that grows from pride
in our powers and ignorance of our ignorance. Beware then of the
heathen gods; have no confidence in principles that come to us in the
trappings of the eternal. Meet them with gentle irony, friendly skepticism
and an open soul."1
The man who distrusts eternal principles, who feels that no age
or generation has truth securely by the tail, will almost without fail
approach his value-judgment tasks in a cautious spirit of forbearance.
So Learned Hand would have the judge approach the solution of
judicial problems with a wary and cautious mind-a mind distrustful
of temporary gusts of opinion that gain momentary power and cautious
in writing into the law ancient prejudices and personal bias.
In addition to his firm convictions that judges are charged with
the responsibility of shaping the law to conform to the demands of
the society in which it operates and that they must be skeptical about
old values and cautious in advancing beyond the established frontiers,
10. L. HAND 82, reprinted from 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1930).

11. L. HAND 101, reprinted from Democracy: Its Presumptions and Realties,

1 FED. B. J. 40 (1932).
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he is just as firmly convinced that the representative assemblies are
the forums for the determination of public policy issues. He realizes
that it is in these forums that the various pressure groups and interests compromise their differences, and he thinks that such delicate
compromises so hard to come by should not be disturbed by a judiciary
subservient to an interest or anxious to have its way. In 1933 over a
nation-wide radio network of the Columbia Broadcasting System,
Judge Hand delivered a lecture under the auspices of the National
Advisory Council on Radio in Education on the subject, "How Far Is
a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?" In this lecture he made his
position on judicial legislation quite clear. He said:
In, our country we have always been extremely jealous of mixing the
different processes of government, especially that of making law, with that
of saying what it is after it has been made. This distinction, if I am
right, cannot be rigidly enforced; but like most of those ideas, which
the men who made our constitutions believed in, it has a very sound basis
as a guide, provided one does not try to make it into an absolute rule,
like driving to the right. They wanted to have a government by the
people, and they believed that the only way they could do it, was
by giving the power to make laws to the assemblies which the people
chose, directly or at second hand. They believed that such assemblies
would express the common will of the people who were to rule. Never
mind what they thought that common will was; it is not so simple as it
seems to learn just what they did mean by it, or what anybody can
mean. It is enough that they did not mean by it what any one individual, whether or not he was a judge, should think right and proper.
They might have made the judge the mouthpiece of the common will,
finding it out by his contacts with people generally; but he then would
have been ruler like the Judges of Israel. Still, they had to leave him
scope in which he in a limited sense does act as if he were the government,
because, as we have seen, he cannot otherwise do what he is required to
do. So far they had to confuse lawmaking with law interpreting.
But the judge must always remember that he should go no further than
he is sure the government would have gone, had it been faced with the
case before him. If he is in doubt he must stop, for he cannot tell that
the conflicting interests in the society for which he speaks would have
come to a just result, even though he is sure that he knows what the
just result should be. He is not to substitute his even juster will for
theirs; otherwise it would not be the common will which prevails, and
to that extent the people would not govern.1 2

Learned Hand is undoubtedly aware of the fact that judges actually
do a good bit of judicial legislating, but being aware of the judges'
freedom to effect the policy decisions of the legislative bodies by the
process of interpretation leads him to believe that judges should exercise this function with great moderation and self-restraint. It is
probable that Judge Hand would not go so far as Holmes in the direction of judicial legislation. It was Justice Holmes's belief that the
12. L. HAND 108-09.
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very ease with which law could be changed justified a large measure
of judicial legislative activity. He wrote in The Common Law:
The philosophical habit of the day, the frequency of legislation, and
the ease with which the law may be changed to meet the opinions
and wishes of the public, all make it natural and unavoidable that
judges as well as others should openly discuss the legislative principles
upon which their decisions must always rest in the end, and should
base their judgments upon broad considerations of policy to which the
traditions of the bench would hardly have tolerated a reference fifty
years ago.13

Judge Hand, however, is of the opinion that the very ease with which
law can now be made demands that the judiciary leave the matter of
determining policy issues to the assemblies representing the people.
Before the development which fashioned assemblies into lawmaking
bodies there might have been a basis for the judiciary to engage in
lawmaking. Then the judges as guardians of the customary law had
to shape and fashion it to meet the needs of a dynamic society. The
new development rendered it far less necessary and thus, in effect,
operated to limit the judge's discretion. 14
Judge Hand discussed this aspect of the problem of the limits of
judicial discretion in a speech entitled, "The Contributions of an
Independent Judiciary to Civilization" in 1944, on the occasion of the
celebration of the 250th anniversary of the founding of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts. He began by distinguishing between
customary and constitutional law on the one hand and "enacted" law
on the other. By the term "enacted" law Judge Hand meant "any
authoritative command of an organ of government purposely made
responsive to the pressure of the interests affected."' 5 He assumed that
before such laws were passed the conflicting interests had had an opportunity to exert their influence in the press, in public meetings, and
by appearances before committees and the like. The resulting compromise worked out by the legislature, he reasoned, represented the
best that could be obtained, and he was of the opinion that these laws
should be enforced loyally by the courts until they could be altered by
the same process which had made them. "Such laws," said Hand,
"need but one canon of interpretation, to understand what the real
13. HOLMES, THE COMMOx LAW 78 (1938). In this connection Judge Frank
writes: "A satirist might indeed suggest that it is regrettable that the practice of precedent-mongering does not involve conscious deception, for it would
be comparatively easy for judges entirely aware of what they were doing,
to abandon such conscious deception and to report accurately how they
arrived at their decisions. Unfortunately, most judges have no such awareness. Worse than that, they are not even aware that they are unaware.
Judges Holmes, Cardozo, Hand, Hutcheson, Lehman and a few others have
attained the enlightened state of awareness of their unawareness." FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND 153 (1930).
14. CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION (1952).
15. L. HAN 172, reprinted from THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 1692-1942.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 9

accord was. 1 6 The judge, he argued, had no mandate to write his
own personal view into law because he no longer represented a
homogeneous governing class. His function was merely to enforce
the will of the people as that will had become translated into the
7
terms of law which he had taken an oath to enforce.'
Judge Hand, however, would permit judges more freedom and a
wider scope for the exercise of discretion in interpreting customary law
or the common law than in the case of "enacted" law. His views and
their justification he expressed succinctly in a cogent paragraph from
the same article:
The respect all men feel in some measure for customary law lies deep
in their nature; we accept the verdict of the past until the need for change
cries out loudly enough to force upon us a choice between the comforts of
further inertia and the irksomeness of action. Through the openings given
by that disposition, the common law has been fabricated bit by bit
without express assent and under the ministrations of those who have
always protested that, like the Bourbons, they learn nothing and forget
nothing. Logically, the irresponsibility of an independent judiciary is
here an anomaly, like the common law itself; in a pitilessly consistent
democracy judges would not be making law at all. Why then do we not
resent it? In earlier times when the parturition of statutes was slow and
painful, judicial license was tolerated partly because judges fairly represented the governing classes. While the king was supreme, or nearly so,
he could remove them at pleasure and even when, after the fall of the
Stuarts, they began to hold upon good behavior, they were still for long
in harmony with those who succeeded to the reins. Occasionally-Lord
Mansfield is the classic example-they could without offense make
radical changes in the customary law. That is no longer true; both
the need and the unison have gone; legislation has become easy, judges
no longer speak for the ruling classes. The price of their continued
power must therefore be a self-denying ordinance which forbids change in
what has not already become unacceptable. To compose inconsistencies,
to unravel confusions, to announce unrecognized implications, to make
in Holmes' now hackneyed phrase, "interstitial"advances; these are the
16. L. HAND at 174.
17. Jaffe discusses this problem in an article reviewing Konefsky's book,
Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court. He writes: "We meet finally
a question as perplexing as it is pertinent. If judges must have notions, where
are they to get them? Mr. Konefsky speaks of the 'personal equation' as if it
were something to be taken for granted; and it is, I think, one of the most
unfortunate perversions of the modern school that so many of us have
accepted that view in its grossest form. We first, for realistic analysis, recognize the existence of the 'personal equation' and we end by sanctifying it in
those judges whose equation we approve. Is every judge commissioned to
make his equation the law? If he is a puritan shall the Constitution outlaw
cakes and ale? ... Some latter day thought, misunderstanding the argument
and overlooking the practice of Holmes, himself, has assumed that the
'law' is to be a simple day to day register of the 'more progressive view,'
However valid a theory of legislation, this is wide of the mark as a theory of
judicial power. The judge has no mandate to carry out a specific program.
He is not to judge according to his will or with his ear cocked to a constituency. His oath is to judge according to the 'law.'" 59 HARv. L. REv. 304,
307 (1945).
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measure of what they may properly do; and there is indeed not much
danger of their exceeding this limit; rather the contrary, for they are
curiously timid about innovations. 18
On the question of how much discretion the judge should be permitted as an interpreter of constitutional law Learned Hand expressed
rather definite views. Since a constitution is primarily an instrument
for the distribution of political powers, he saw the necessity of some
tribunal to determine when the distribution had been upset and unbalanced. Otherwise, he reasoned that those who held the purse strings
would in the end gain the ascendancy. A tribunal dedicated to the
task of upholding the authority of the distributing document must
of necessity be an independent one. The price of such independence,
he felt, must be an objective and secure aloofness from transient
policy making. He realized, however, that the technique of those
who sought to solve constitutional questions should be different from
that used in the interpretation of statutes. Because constitutions deal
in generalities and leave many gaps to be filled, the judiciary has
more leeway here. He cited the way in which the judiciary has expanded the commerce power of Congress to meet the needs of a changing society as an example of the way in which general statements may
be expanded to meet the demands of the times. This function of the
judiciary he considered a proper one and, because the strains set up
by decisions of such issues are never very tense, he was of the opinion
that no serious consequences would result from the exercise of judicial
discretion in respect to such issues.
When it came to the proper limits of judicial discretion to guard
and interpret the Bill of Rights, however, Judge Hand expressed himself of another mind. In answer to the question, why should not their
meaning be found in the same way as that of the rest of the instrument, he answered:
[T]hese rubrics were meant to answer future problems unimagined and
unimaginable. Nothing which by the utmost liberality can be called interpretation describes the process by which they must be applied. Indeed
if law be a command for specific conduct, they are not law at all; they
are cautionary warnings against the intemperance of faction and the first
approaches of despotism. The answers to the questions which they
raise demand the appraisal and balancing of human values which there
are no scales to weigh. Who can say whether the contributions of one
group may not justify allowing it a preference? How far should the
capable, the shrewd or the strong be allowed to exploit their powers?
When does utterance go beyond persuasion and become only incitement?
How far are children wards of the state so as to justify its intervention
in their nurture? What limits should be imposed on the right to inherit?
.. . The difficulty here does not come from ignorance, but from the
absence of any standard, for values are incommensurable. It is true that
18. L. HAND 174-75. (Emphasis added.)
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theoretically, and sometimes practically, cases can arise where courts
might properly intervene, not indeed because the legislature has appraised the values wrongly, for it is hard to see how that can be if it
has honestly tried to appraise them at all; but because that is exactly
what it has failed to do, because its action has been nothing but the patent
exploitation of one group whose interests it has altogether disregarded.
But the dangers are always very great.19

The dangers of judicial interference with the legislative will, Judge
Hand felt, flowed from the simple fact that judges are individuals and
not more likely to have proper standards by which to measure than any
other group nor more likely to be free from the bias of professional
interest. If a court were really candid, all it could say would be:
We find this measure will have this result; it will injure this group in
such and such ways, and benefit that group in these other ways. We
declare it invalid, because after every conceivable allowance for differences of outlook, we cannot see how a fair person can honestly believe
that the benefits balance the losses. 20

As a practical matter, however, Judge Hand was of the opinion that
judges should seldom intervene because the multiplicity of factors
bearing upon the decision of the legislature as well as the incommensurable nature of the clashing values make it almost impossible to,
say that the legislature has surrendered to a faction in a cowardly
and incompetent fashion.
His views on the problem of how the Bill of Rights should be regarded by the judge is well summarized in one of his own paragraphs:
Nor need it surprise us that these stately admonitions refuse to subject
themselves to analysis. They are the precipitates of "old, unhappy,
far-off things, and battles long ago," originally cast as universals to enlarge
the scope of the victory, to give it authority, to reassure the very victors
themselves that they have been champions in something more momentous
than a passing struggle. Thrown large upon the screen of the future as
eternal verities, they are emptied of the vital occasions which gave them
birth, and become moral adjurations, the more imperious because inscrutable, but with only that content which each generation must pour
into them anew in the light of its own experience. If an independent
judiciary seeks to fill them from its own bosom, in the end it will cease
to be independent. And its independence will be well lost, for that
bosom is not ample enough for the hopes and fears of all sorts and
conditions of men, nor will its answers be theirs; it must be content
to stand aside from these fateful battles. There are two ways in which
the judges may forfeit their independence, if they do not abstain. If they
are intransigent but honest, they will be curbed; but a worse fate will
befall them if they learn to trim their sails to the prevailing winds. A
society whose judges have taught it to expect complaisance will exact
complaisance; and complaisance under the pretense of interpretation
is rottenness. If judges are to kill this thing they love, let them do it,
21
not like cowards with a kiss, but like brave men with a sword.
19. L. HAND 177.
20. L. HAND 179.
21. L. HAND 180-81.
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To the question: What will become of these cherished principles enshrined in our constitutions if the judges do not enter the strife to
uphold them? he answered:
I do not think anyone can say what will be left of those principles; I do
not know whether they will serve only as counsels; but this much I
think I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is
gone, no court can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes no
court need save; that in a society which evades its responsibility by
thrusting upon courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will
perish. What is the spirit of moderation? It is the temper which does
not press a partisan advantage to its bitter end, which can understand and
will respect the other side, which feels a unity between all citizens-real
and not the factious product of propaganda- which recognizes their common fate and their common aspirations-in a word, which has faith in the
sacredness of the individual. If you ask me how such a temper and such
a faith are bred and fostered, I cannot answer. They are the last flowers of
civilization, delicate and easily overrun by the weeds of our sinful
human nature; we may even now be witnessing their uprooting and
disappearance until in the progress of the ages their seed can once more
find some friendly soil. But I am satisfied that they must have the vigor
within themselves to withstand the winds and weather of an indifferent
and ruthless world; and that it is idle to seek shelter for them within a
courtroom. 22

Again in 1946 in a slender article contributed to the Columbia Law
Review as a part of a memorial number in honor of Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone entitled "Chief Justice Stone's Concept of the Judicial
Function,"23 Learned Hand expressed views almost identical with those
which he had voiced two years before in the article from which the
above quotation was excerpted. It is true that they were expressed
this time as Chief Justice Stone's views, but there can be no doubt
that they represented Hand's views as well. In this article he traced
the historical development by which the old view that the fourteenth
amendment was designed to protect property rights against legislative
impairment had been challenged by a new school of jurists who viewed
the Bill of Rights as counsels of moderation and considered legislative
compromises the very essence of the democratic political process.
With the triumph of the new view the matter appeared to be settled
until a new school arose which professed to see the Bill of Rights as
22. L. HAND 181-82. Mr. Paul A. Freund quotes this excerpt from Judge
Hand's essay and notes with approval the strength of his position. Freund,
The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 551 (1951).
However, Mr. Shute quotes this passage and comments: "This attitude denies
the power of courts to encourage and foster a feeling of tolerance among
the people of the nation through the tolerance of their own decisions. This
power exists and has been asserted in the past.... The courts are the last
hope of a democratic nation; they are the last stop before total decadence; the
courts, above all other governmental groups in this country, must foster and
protect a love of democratic tolerance, else there is little hope that such
will long last." Comment, 17 Mo. L. REv. 193, 204 (1952).
23. L. HAwD 202-08, reprinted from 57 COLUM. L. REV. 696-99 (1946).
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counsels of moderation when the protection of property was involved
but as carrying the old prohibitions as a rule of law when civil rights
were affected by the legislative compromise. To Learned Hand this
appeared inconsistent. He saw no reason why the same principle
should not apply in both areas; nor could he understand by what
reasoning the right to property should be classed as something less
than a civil right. It was his view that judges should be very chary
of disturbing legislative compromises in both areas. Although Judge
Hand was speaking of Justice Stone's concept of the judicial function,
it is apparent that these beliefs were his own. He had voiced them
before.24
In the final analysis, much depends upon the spirit with which a
judge approaches the solution of a constitutional problem for the
words are empty vessels into which he must pour now and again
fresh content. Since this is so, Judge Hand would have his judge a
man of wide reading and sensitive understanding whose outlook is
not limited by ignorance or class prejudice. In this connection his own
words are eloquent:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass
upon a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon, and Carlyle, with
Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne,
and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume, and Kent, as with the books
which have been specifically written on the subject. For in such matters
everything turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the question
before him. The words he must construe are empty vessels into which he
can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not gather figs of thistles, nor
supply institutions from judges whose outlook is limited by parish or
class. They must be aware that there are before them more than verbal
problems; more than final solutions cast in generalizations of universal
applicability. They must be aware of the changing social tensions in
every society which make it an organism; which demand new schemata of
2
adaptation; which will disrupt it, if rigidly confined. 5
Professor Eugene V. Rostow of Yale University Law School in an
article written for the Harvard Law Review on the subject, "The
Democratic Character of Judicial Review,"2 6 has recently subjected
the Hand view of the proper limits of judicial discretion to a heavy
critical barrage. It is Professor Rostow's firm conviction that judicial
review is "a tool of proven use in the American quest for an open
society of widely dispersed powers. ' '27 He points out that "the freedom of the legislatures to act within wide limits of constitutional con24. Cf. The Contributions of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, L.

HAND 172-82. See also comment by Freund on Judge Hand's services in point-

ing up this problem, 4 VAND. L. R.v. 533, 546 (1951).
25. L. HAND 81, reprinted from 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1-14 (1930).
26. 66 HARV. L. REv. 193-224 (1952).
27. Id. at 199.
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struction is the wise rule of judicial policy only if .the processes through
which they act are reasonably democratic";2 8 and.he recalls Chief
Justice Stone's argument that, since in many instances legislative acts
"are directed against interests which are not or cannot be represented
in the legislature," 29 the Court should not accord such legislation the
respect usually given statutes which represent compromise of the
affected interests. He feels that there is little danger that the present
Supreme Court will set itself up as a Third Chamber now, -or in the
future, for the public has been educated to the exercise of enormous
powers by both and national and the state governments. Of Judge
Learned Hand's often expressed belief that judges should abstain
from the policy struggles of the day and leave such matters to the
legislatures except in the ,clearest cases of abuse of power Professor
Rostow says:
The argument that action -by the, courts in 'protecting' the liberties of
the citizens is. futile in bad times, and unnecessary in good ones, is
fundamentally wrong. Judge Learned Hand has given- the contrary view
its strongest and most eloquent form.
In a passage of Browningesque passion and obscurity, he advances the
thesis that the judiciary will lose the independence it needs for its other
functions unless it resolutely refuses to decide cohstitutional questions
of this order. The general constitutional commands of fairness--and
equality, which he nowhere identifies in detail, are "moral adjurations,
the more imperious because inscrutable, but with only .that content which
each generation must pour into them anew in the light of its own experience. If an independent judiciary seeks to fill them from its own
bosom, in the end it will cease to be irdependent.. ." This gloomy and
apocalyptic view is a triumph of logic over life. It reflects the dark
shadows thrown upon the judiciary by the Court-packing fight of 1937.
Judge Hand is preoccupied with a syllogism. The people and the Congress
have the naked power to destroy the independence of the courts. Therefore the courts must avoid arousing the sleeping lions by venturing to
construe the broad and sweeping clauses of the Constitution which would
"demand the appraisal and balancing of human values which there are
no scales to weigh." Presumably he would include in this catalogue of
forbidden issues problems of freedom of speech, the separation of church
and state, and the limits, if any, to which "the capable, the shrewd or the
strong," should "be allowed to exploit their powers." Are we to read
the last phrase as encompassing the right of habeas corpus, the central
civil liberty and the most basic of all protections 'against the authority
of the state? Would it deny the possibility of constitutional review by the
courts for laws denying the vote to negroes, for searches and seizures without warrant, for bills of attainder and test oaths?3 0
The clear implication is that inherent in the Hand view of judicial
discretion is an affirmative answer to all of the questions raised,
and that an affirmative answer is unwise and somehow unacceptable.
28. Id. at 202.
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 203-06.
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Actually the Hand answer to such questions is reasonable and forceful. If a society depends upon courts to preserve those values which
it once cherished but has lost, it is doomed to disappointment. Courts
cannot save social values that have become meaningless or that have
lost their efficacy as social forces. Courts of necessity operate in a
social milieu; judges take their values from the community of which
they are a part; they must perforce accept what is acceptable to the
society of their day and reject what is unacceptable. Courts do not
create social values; rather they reflect them. If a spirit of fair play
and respect for rights and opinions of others withers in a nation,
can it be replaced by a scolding judge or an outraged jurist?
In its essence the argument of Professor Rostow simmers down
to the traditional defense of judicial review with a new ingredient:
although judicial review as a protection for vested property interests
was a wall that had to be torn down, as a protection for civil liberties
it must be rebuilt and fortified. It raises once more above this rebuilt
wall the tarnished banner of the double standard of constitutional interpretation. It neglects to consider that the essence of democracy
is compromise and that even judges must bend an ear to the wind.
It fails to weigh the obvious fact that law is a conservative force and
feels self-conscious and ill at ease in the forefront of a social advance
that has not behind it the united will of society.
The questions may well be asked: From whence comes Hand's view
of the nature and scope of the judicial function? Has it been distilled
from experience and observation? What factors contributed to its
formulation? Naturally, the answers to such questions are somewhat
difficult to come by. Certainly one factor to be considered is the nature
of the training he received at the Harvard Law School. His teacher of
constitutional law, James Bradley Thayer, was extremely interested
in the question of the scope of the judicial power in passing upon the
constitutionality of legislation. It was Thayer's considered view that
the power of courts in this respect was distinctly limited. His essay,
"The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law," is devoted to an analysis of his views. A great teacher who could
write:
The judicial function is that of merely fixing the outside border of
reasonable legislative action, the boundary beyond which the taxing
power, the power of eminent domain, police power and legislative power
in general, cannot go without violating the prohibitions of the constitution
31
or crossing the lines of its grants.

and
It [the Court] can only disregard the Act when those who have the right
to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very
32
clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question.
31.

THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS

32. Id. at 21.

27 (1908).
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must surely have impressed upon an apt and admiring student the
strength of his position.
Another factor bearing upon Hand's concept of the limited nature
of the judicial function is the extent to which judicial review was
being used during his early years on the bench for the purpose of
thwarting the will of the legislatures in respect to statutes regulating
industry. To an alert and penetrating mind such as his this development seemed to violate the postulates of a democratic system and do
violence to the ultimate power and prestige of the judiciary. It is
always harzardous to attempt to assess those influences that shape
the character and temperament of a man. In the case of Hand, versatile, intelligent, and sensitive as he is, it is doubly difficult. Yet it may
be hazarded that his early legal training as well as his observation,
experience, and the cast of his character had something to do with
fixing his beliefs.
In summary, it may be said that Learned Hand would draw the
limits of judicial discretion rather strictly. He prefers to leave policy
decisions to legislatures; he believes that abstention from such heated
controversies is the price of judicial prestige and independence. The
judge does have a creative role within his limited sphere, and that
is the responsible task of gently moulding the customary law to conform to new social patterns and half-emerging jural aspirations When
the judge is called upon to legislate, he should do it with courage and
understanding but with his feet firmly planted in the tradition of his
craft. He would scarcely approve of Justice Marshall's pronouncement:
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has
no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will
nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed
by the law; and when that is discerned, it is the duty of the courts to
follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving
effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to
the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.33
Judge Hand is franker than Justice Marshall to admit that the scope
for creative activity by the judiciary is for various reasons relatively
wide; nevertheless, in all of his writings on the subject he makes the
point that judges should be properly cautious in the legislative function. He is at one with-Lord Mansfield- that:
[D]iscretion when applied to a court of justice means sound discretion
guided by law. It must be sound discretion governed by rule not humor;
it must not be arbitrary, vague or fanciful, but legal and regular.34
33. Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866
(1824).
34. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr 2527, 2539, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1720). For a
statement of Hand's views, see Niagara Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
137 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1943).
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- There ean'be little: doubt that Learned Hand looks with some disapproval upon the new school of jurists known as the Realists who
hAve Wbn -s6ihe converts to the view that judges either because of
the re~dyavailability of "precedents going both ways" or because they
are in -the fifial analysis the chief determiners of the meaning of
words, 6f, betaiibs of the gaps in the law, are free Jo decide cases as
they -will. These jurists maintain that there is no law in existence on
a-given subject ufitil the court has spoken; that a lawyer can not advise
hig client as t-o
what the law is, but is confined to venturing a prophecy
mora or less well4ounded as to what a court will actually do when
confronted with the actual decision of the issue. 35 To Learned Hand
the'law does exist as a body of principles and rules from which the
judge constantly draws inferences and deductions. His logic is the
16gic of discovery as well as the logic of demonstration, It makes a
great deal of difference whether a judge proceeds from a so-called selfevident major pr~mise, or proceeds to establish his major premise by
a- consideration of all the precedents that bear upon the solution of
the legal problem at hand. Judge Hand is aware of this difference.
While- Hand would !agree with Holmes that the "life of the law has
been-experien'ce":he would still regard this experience as chaotic and
unorganized until it has. been- moulded by logic and reason into a fit
and proper legal instrument for the solution of judicial controversies.
o Judge CharlgE. Wyzanski, Jr., writing in the Harvard Law Review
in an article, one of several, in an issue dedicated to the celebration
of Judge Hand's seventy-fifth birthday, very fittingly said of Judge
Hand:
*

-

Many, there -will be who disagree with his ideal of the judge. They
would have him one of the principal seekers after social reform and
moral betterment, They would urge that he prepare himself by independent investigation so that at appropriate times he might come
forward as a teacher of his original solutions. And they would prefer him
otipply the "la as the lever by which society was raised as near as may
be'to 'the lvel 'of his intelligence and vision.
- For this roler
of prophet, innovator and statesman Learned Hand has
never billed himself. To him the judge who took the central role would
have. betrayed his trust. He was commissioned for a different part-a
leader of the Greek chorus interpreting and appraising the drama. The

35. Augustus N. Hand in a conversation with the writer indicated that both
LearnednHand and he viewed the realists with tolerant skepticism. Professor
Edwin- W. Patterson of Columbia University, speaking of the HolmesCardozo-BEand moderate view of the judicial function, wrote: "Inthe long run
this view represents a sound political principle, that every judge should
take a modest view of his power to 'legislate' in order that he may maintain
his independence of the political pressures of the moment and be able to
protect individuals against oppression by other officials, even when the
latter are acting with the approval of majority groups." PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE, MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAw

576-77 (1953).
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artistry, the forbearance in judgment and the faithfulness with- which

Learned Hand has performed that part are his principal contributions to
public law.36

THE HAND FORMULA FOR THE INTERPRETATIO14N OF STATUTES

Judge Hand has achieved a firmer and sounder reputation as a

judge than most men of his profession. The acclaim which he has
received from members of his own calling sometimes almost borders

on the extravagant. Judge and author Jerome Frank dedicated his
book, Courts on Trial, to him in these words: "To Learned Hand,
our wisest judge."3 7 The Honorable Joln J. Parker, one of the, most
experienced and distinguished members of the. federal bench, once
said: "All of us oknow that he is not only one of the greatest judges
of this generation,, but he is one of the greatest judges that have ever
sat on a court of the United States. '" Justice Felix Frankfurter has
spoken in such. terms as: "I have said of Learned Hand that he has
become a legend, but his achievements created that legend." 39 . The
late Justice Cardozo is said to have labeled him the greatest living
jurist.40 If Learned Hand be the great judge that great men of .the
bench unite in designating him, an analysis of his opinions should show
forth his greatness. And, since the work of the judge is mainly taken
up with interpretation of statutes, the Hand formula of. interpretation
should be a model for lesser men to follow or at least strive after.
What is there about the Hand technique or insighl,,that produces
opinions of such universal admiration? To determipe-that techniquie
or quality would not insure its possession by another, but such a
determination should at least isolate those techniques and that method
which seems to excite most admiration among the experts in. the
field. Conceivably, it might shed light on the complex .problem of
judicial interpretation.
For purposes of this analysis, three theories of statutory interpretation merit examination and discussion. 41 The first may be called.the
literal theory. According to this theory, which Judge Hand calls ;the
"dictionary method," the interpreter confines himsejf to the .very
letter of the text of the statute and, having extracted from each wprd
its proper meaning, he applies it to the solution .of the case at bar.
This process has the value of objectivity and is alike available to
both the judge and to him who is being judged. This is a relatively old
36. Wyzanski, Hand's Contributions to Public Law, -60 HARV. -L. REV. 369

(1947).

37. FRANK, CoURTS-ON TRIAL, Dedication page (1949).

38. 33 A.B.A.J. 502"(1948).
39. Id. at 503. "
40. See New York Herald Tribune, May 17, 1951, p. 12, col: 3.

41. See SHARTEL, OUR LEGAL SYSTEIVLAND How IT OPERATES 318-87 (1951), for

a discussion of these theories.
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method and one hallowed by such a name as that of Justice Story. 42
It is a method that was used in the early days of our judicial history
when the volume of statutory law was relatively light and the
subjects with which it dealt relatively simple.
The second theory or method of procedure involves an attempt to
discover what the intent of the legislature really was-what purposes
the legislators were, by the use of the language employed, seeking to
realize. This method came to be employed more and more by courts
as the volume of statutory enactments increased and as the subject
matter of legislation became so complex as to preclude detailed statutory instructions. Naturally enough, it offered less restrictive limits
for judicial activity. It had always been the province of judges to
shape and mould the law in its application, but this was often forgotten by those who were concerned lest judges usurp the function
of legislatures. Judges were accused of reading into the statutes their
own preferences while ostensibly hewing to the line of the older
theory of interpretation. This led some judges and publicists to pro43
pound what has been called the "free interpretation theory."
According to this latter-day theory the judiciary and the public
should frankly admit that judges are free to interpret as they choose
whenever the text of the statute is not so clear as to make choice
usurpation and the legislative will a mockery. This theory stresses
the personal factor in the judicial equation. Its proponents differ
among themselves in respect to the source of judicial standards; some
advocate custom, equity, and good conscience; others prefer that the
judge prepare himself by independent investigation to translate into
the law the conclusions he has reached.
It can be readily seen that to apply the words of a text literally
may often defeat the very purpose of the statute. Much depends upon
reading the text in such a way as to effectuate the purpose behind
the law. Words are merely symbols for the communication of ideas;
their meanings shift, and they sometimes take their import from the
entire context in which they are used, culturally as well as rhetorically.
Judge Jerome Frank relates an amusing story in point.44 It is the
story of Miss Goodlooks, the chorus girl, who in an emergency acted
the part of Ophelia in Hamlet. In the player's scene, according to
the text being used, Hamlet asks Ophelia, "Are you chaste?" She
answers, "My Lord?" But Miss Goodlooks rendered it, "Chaste? My
42. See 1 STORY, TiH CONSTITUTION § 406 (5th ed. 1905). Compare Kent's
commentary as quoted by FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 98 (1942). Thus

Chancellor Kent explained how he arrived at a judicial decision: "He first
made himself master of the facts. Then he said, 'I saw where justice lay and
the moral sense decided the court half the time; I then sat down to search
I might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical
the authorities ....
rule, but I almost always found principles suited to my view of the case.'"
43. SHARTEL, op. cit. supra note 41, at 327.
44. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 301 (1949).
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Lord!" When chided she remarked, "Well, that was my interpretation of the part."
So if there is a danger in interpreting a text literally and applying
that literal interpretation for the solution of a legal problem, there
is also a danger in free interpretation; for it permits the judge to
read into the law his own bias and so plays havoc with consistency and
certainty, ideas which lie deep in the very concept-law. Furthermore,
to elevate the personal factor undermines the independence of the
judiciary. This arises from the propensity of whatever interest is
momentarily preponderant to elevate to the courts judges whose
personal preferences it desires to make the law.
Judge Hand has managed to steer a safe course between the danger
represented by a too literal interpretation and that threatened by
an interpretation so free as to enthrone personal bias and individual
preference. He described his technique as follows:
It seems a simple matter, especially when the law is written down in a
book, with care and detail, just to read it and say what is its meaning.
Perhaps this could be made as easy as it seems, if the law used language
coined expressly for its purposes, like science, or mathematics, or music.
But that would be practically undesirable, because while the government's
commands are to be always obeyed, still they should include only what
is generally accepted as just, or convenient, or usual, and should be stated
in terms of common speech, so they may be understood by those who are
to obey, and may not appear foreign to their notions of good or sensible

conduct....
The judge must therefore find out the will of the government from

words which are chosen from common speech and which had better
not attempt to provide for every possible contingency. How does he in
fact proceed? Although at times he says and believes that he is not doing
so, what he really does is to take the language before him, whether it be
from a statute or from the decision of a former judge, and try to find
out what the government, or his predecessor, would have done if the case

before him had been before them. He calls this finding the intent of the
statute or the doctrine. This is often not really true. The men who
used the language did not have any intent at all about the case that has
come. up; it.
had not occurred to their, minds. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to know what they would have said about it, if it had. All
they would have done is to write down certain words which they mean
to apply generally to situations of that kind. To apply these literally
may either pervert what was plainly their general meaning, or leave
undisposed of what there is every reason to suppose they meant to provide
for. Thus it is not enough for the judge just to use the dictionary. If
he should do no more, he might come up with a result which every
sensible man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what was really

intended; which would contradict or leave unfulfilled its plain purpose.
Thus, on the one hand he cannot go beyond what has been said,
because he is bound to enforce existing commands and only those;
on the other, he cannot suppose that what has been said should clearly
frustrate or leave unexecuted its own purpose. This is his frequent
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position in cases that are not very plain; that is to say, in the greater number that arise. As I have said, there are two extreme schools, neither one
of which is willing to apply its theory consistently, usually applying it
when its interests lie along the path it advocates. One school says that
the judge must follow the letter of the law absolutely. I call this the
dictionary school. No matter what the result is, he must read the words
in their usual meaning and stop where they stop. No judges have
ever carried on literally in that spirit, and they would not be long
tolerated if they did.
.... The other school would give them almost complete latitude. They
argue that a judge should not regard the law; that this has never really
been done in the past, and that to attempt ever to do it is an illusion.
He must conform his decision to what honest men would think right,
and it is better for him to look into his own heart to find out what this
is. As I have said, in a small way some such process is inevitable when
one is interpreting any written words. When a judge tries to find out
what the government would have intended which it did not say, he puts
into its mouth things which he things it ought to have said, and that is
very close to substituting what he himself thinks right. Let him beware,
however, or he will usurp the office of government, even though in a small
way he must do so in order to execute its real commands at all.
But the judge must always remember that he should go no further
than he is sure the government would have gone, had it been faced
with the case before him. If he is in doubt, he must stop, for he cannot
tell that the conflicting interests in the society for which he speaks would
have come to a just result, even though he is sure that he knows what
the just result should be. He is not to substitute even his juster will
for theirs; otherwise it would not be the common will which prevails, and
to that extent the people would not govern.
So you will see that a judge is in a contradictory position; he is pulled
by two opposite forces. On the one hand he must not enforce whatever he
thinks best; he must leave that to the common will expressed by the
government. On the other, he must try as best he can to put into concrete form what that will is, not by slavishly following the words, but
by trying honestly to say what was the underlying purpose expressed.

Nobody does this exactly right; great judges do it better than the rest
,of us. It is necessary that someone shall do it, if we are to realize the
45
hope that we can collectively rule ourselves.

It can be seen from the quoted passage above that Judge Hand
attempts to fulfill in his application of the law the underlying purpose
of its framers. Another aspect of his technique is the use he makes of
legislative history. On many occasions Learned Hand has resorted
to congressional committee reports, debates in Congress, and other
outside material in order to reproduce the setting in which the law
was made so as to understand better just what the lawmakers were
trying to accomplish by the words they used.46 It is to be understood,
45. L. HAND 105-09. (Emphasis added.) Cf. Judge Hand's views
tation expressed in' HArris v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 861 (2d
and his statement in Lee v--Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 178 F.2d 750,
1949); see Lavin v. Lavin, 1821.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1950).
46. See Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir' 1949);

of interpreCir. 1949),
751 (2d Cir.
S. C. John-
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however, that Judge Hand in no way decisively relies upon legislative
history as a primary means of determining the purpose and intent
of the lawmakers; rather he uses it as a help, a guide by means of
which the intent of the legislators many become clearer and more precise. He does not scorn to use such material merely because it is
extra-judicial and non-authoritative. That this technique is coming to
be increasingly more acceptable is indicated by the approval accorded
it by certain of the publicists and by the Supreme Court's use of
the device as an aid in interpretation. Mr. J. P. Chamberlain writing
in the University of Chicago Law Review in 1933 remarked:
Committee reports are now definitely a part of the equipment of the
court for the interpretation of the meaning of statutes and for deciding
their constitutionality. They are not decisive but they are persuasive. 47
Even earlier, in 1925, Mr. Clarence A. Miller writing in the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review had given the practice his blessing:
A more general use of the legislative history of statutes as an aid in determining legislative intent will serve to materially lessen judicial
legislation. 48
The use of legislative history by Judge Hand, as a help in the determination of legislative intent when interpreting the written words
of a statute, may properly stem from the general view he holds of
the legislative function. If judges are to leave to the legislators the
problem of compromising conflicting interests and keep for themselves
a very modest role in lawmaking, it follows that almost every device
for determining the will, the actual will of the lawmaking body, is
justified and explained. A judge who viewed the judiciary as active
partner with the legislature in lawmaking would necessarily take a
dimmer view of the use that might be made of such materials. Hand's
use of outside aids is then a testimonial to his firm conviction that
the judge is chiefly concerned with the application of law, not with
its creation.
That the Hand formula for the interpretation of statutes includes
son & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949); Borella v. Borden Co., 145
F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1944); Lenroot v. Western Union Tel. Co., 141 F.2d 400 (2d
Cir. 1944).
41. 1 U. Cm. L. Rv. 81, 86 (1933).
48. 73 U. PA. L. REv. 158, 170 (1925). See the following cases for examples
of the use -by federal courts of legislative history as an aid in interpreting
statutes: Federal Power Comm'n v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138
(1948); United States v. Ogilvie Hardware Co., 330 U.S. 709 (1947); United
States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921); McCauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327
U.S. 540 (1946); Lapina v. Williarms, 232 U.S. 78 (1914); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). See also the following articles: Sparkman, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Laws, ArA. L. REv. 189 (1950); A
Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in FederatCourts' 52 CoLum.
L. REv. 125 (1952); A Symposium on Statutory Construction, 3 V TD. L. REv.
. !
365 (1950).
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both a high regard for the actual words of the passage to be interpreted
and an abiding respect for the intent of the lawmakers, as revealed
in the legislative context and the historical setting, is shown not only
by his extra-judicial pronouncements but by the language of his
opinions. Many of his opinions carry dicta on the interpretative function and process. Excerpts from select cases underline his methods and
his convictions. In Commissioner v. Ickelheimer he said:
Compunctions about judicial legislation are right enough as long as we
have any genuine doubt as to the breadth of the legislature's intent; and
no doubt the most important single factor in ascertaining its intent is
the words it employs. But the colloquial words of a statute have not the
fixed and artificial content of scientific symbols; they have a penumbra, a
dim fringe, a connotation, for they express an attitude of will, into which
it is our duty to penetrate and which we must enforce ungrudgingly when
we can ascertain it, regardless of imprecision in its expression. 49

Again in Borella v. Borden Co., the judge speaks:
[L]egislators, like others concerned with ordinary affairs, do not deal
in rigid symbols, so far as possible stripped of suggestion, and do not
expect their words to be made the starting point of a dialectical progression. We can best reach the meaning here, as always, by recourse
to the underlying purpose, and, with that as a guide, by trying to project
on the specific occasion how we think persons actuated by such a purpose
would have dealt with it, if it had been presented to them at the time.
To say that that is a hazardous process is indeed a truism, but we cannot escape it once we abandon literal interpretation-a method far more
unreliable.
....
We do not mean here, or in any other interpretation of language,
the words used are not far and away the most reliable source for learning
the purpose of a document; the notion that the "policy of a statute" does
not inhere as much in its limitations as in its affirmations, is untenable.50

In Cabell v. Markham, Learned Hand quoted with approval Justice
Holmes' statement from Johnson v. United States5 ' and continued by
repeating the ideas on interpretation he had so often voiced:
"[I]t is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what
you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as
before." [Holmes] Of course it is true that the words used, even in
their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable,
source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature
and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary;
but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to
accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest
guide to their meaning. 52

This technique of searching for the purpose behind legislation and
49.
50.
51.
52.

132 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1943).
145 F.2d 63, 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1944).
163 Fed. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
148 F.2d 737-39 (2d Cir. 1945).
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using that purpose once determined as a guide in interpreting
language was not a latter day acquisition of Judge Hand. As early as
1925 he expressed the familiar view in the case of United States ex rel.
Duner v. Curran:
We acknowledge that our construction in fact involves substituting other
words in place of those used, and we shall seek no locutions to disguise
the liberty taken or the risk assumed. We can appeal, however, to the
universal and ancient practice of courts in dealing with any kind of
words. Their purpose may appear so clearly as to escape defeat, in
spite of the imperfect expression, and though other words must be
imputed to the author. In saying that we are thus ascertaining the
author's intent we speak somewhat elliptically. That intent as a fact in his
mental life is irrelevant; his words are taken to mean what they mean in
public use. But if the contrary expression be not too explicit, the disclosed
purpose may prevail to cover an unforeseen event, which the author
would certainly have comprised by proper words, had it been presented
to him. We can see no useful purpose in denying that this is what takes
53
place in such cases, and it is what we are doing here.

In his Courts on Trial, Judge Jerome Frank has commented on this
practice of Hand's of appealing to the equity of a statute. Commenting
on the case of Usatorrev. The Victoria5 he said: "It there appears that
a great American judge [who tells me that he has never carefully
studied Aristotle] has expressed views that are a modernized paraphrase of that ancient Greek's thesis. '55 The learned judge goes on
to point out in copious footnotes to the Usatorre case the similarity
between Hand's technique and that of Aristotle and even Plowden.
The resemblance is startling. Aristotle wrote:
The "equitable" is, indeed, "just" but not equivalent to the "legal."
It is rather an improvement on the merely legally just. The reason is that
every statute speaks in general terms, but there are some cases upon
which it is impossible to make a universal statement which will be
correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak generally
but not possible to do so correctly, the statute embraces only the majority

of cases, although well knowing the possibility of error. Nor is it the
less correct on this account; for the fault is not in the statute nor in
the legislature, but in the nature of the subject matter. For it is
plainly impossible to pronounce with complete accuracy upon such a
subject matter as human action. Whenever, then, the statute reads in general terms, but a case arises which is not covered by the general
statement, then it is right, where the legislator's rule is inadequate because of its over simplicity to correct the omission which the legislator,
if he were present, would admit, and, had he known it, would have put into
his statute.56
53. 10 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1925).
54. 172 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1949).
55. FRANK, op. cit. supranote 37, at 381.
56. AmasTorx, NIcHOMACHEAN ETHics, bk. V, c. 10, 1137B; quoted by Judge
Frank in Usatorre v. United States, 172 F.2d 434 n.12 (2d Cr.1949).
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Plowden explicitly enunciated the doctrine of the equity of a statute
in his comments on Eyston v. Studd.57 He, too, as early as 1574 formulated a doctrine of statutory interpretation strikingly like that of
Judge Hand. He observed:
From this judgment and the cause of it, the reader may observe that
it is not the words of the law, but the eternal sense of it that makes the
law, and our law (like all others) consists of two parts, viz. of body and
soul, the letter of the law is the body of the law and the sense and
reason of the law is the soul of the law, quia ratio legis est anima legis.
And the law may be resembled to a nut, which has a shell and a kernel
within, the letter of the law represents the shell, and the sense of it the
kernel, and as you will be no better for the nut if you make use only of
the shell, so you will receive no benefit by the law if you rely upon the
letter. And as the fruit and profit of the nut lies in the kernel and not
in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law consists in the sense more
than the letter.5 8
It would appear, then, that the judicial method of Judge Hand is not
new but rather a method hallowed by time and great names, striking
merely because so many judges fail to learn it well and follow it
often.
In final analysis the Hand formula of statutory interpretation resolves itself into four propositions which might be summarized as

follows:
1. If the words of the statute are so clear and plain as to admit
of no doubts as to how they should be applied; if they clearly express the purpose and intent of the lawmakers, the task of the
judge is a relatively easy one; he applies the law as it is written to the
solution of the judicial problem before him and lets the chips fall
where they may.
2. If the words of the statute are so general as to give little guidance,
the judge who is principally concerned with effectuating the intent
and realizing the implicit purpose of the legislators, must seek to
discover that intent and that purpose from the words themselves, the
context in which they are used, both rhetorical and cultural, and from
a case study of the history of the particular piece of legislation as it
was hammered out in the final give-and-take that preceded its final acceptance and final phrasing. Once this intent and this purpose is
so discovered the judge must decide the case before him in such a way
as to give meaning to the intent of the legislature and fulfillment to
its purposes.
3. However, if the lawmakers patently had no intent in respect
to the issues before the judge, if they obviously failed to envisage
circumstances arising as they did arise, then the judge has his
57. 2 Plow. 450, 75 Eng. Rep. 688 (K.B. 1574).
58. Id., 2 Plow. at-465-67.

1956 ]

LIMITS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

difficult hours. Since he is charged with the responsibility of going
no further than the legislators would have gone had they the case
before them, it is the judge's duty to fathom out the half-emerged
purposes behind the legislation and to savor the very spirit of the
enactment. The judicial function here might be compared to what
the expert mender does with a hole burned in a fine coat which he
reweaves-that is, he fits into the legislative omission legal material
of the same pattern and design in such a way as give succor to those
half-expressed, upthrusting purposes, that groping intent.
4. When it is impossible to dig out any intent, when no underlying
purpose may be even dimly discerned, the judge should attempt to
weigh and balance the competing interests and compromise them in
the spirit of the times, never going so far as to accept what, in his
opinion, is not yet acceptable in the society of which he is a part,
but still moulding the law gently and by degrees in such a manner
as to help in giving expression to the jural aspirations of his age.
And all of this must be done with such good sense and proper restraint, with such understanding and sympathy as neither to violate
the established principles of social conduct nor jeopardize the prestige
and high dignity of the judicial office.
This is the Hand recipe, and, as with most recipes, the finished
dish will depend upon the skill and art of the cook. What comes
from the hand of the master may be a dish fit for the Gods but from
the thick hands and futile brain of the scullery maid fit only for dogs.
At least there is this compensation: from the hands of the master
comes good eating and satisfaction.

